Monday, May 23, 2011

Paper finds no empirical link between biofuels, land use changes

"An empirical approach is used to detect evidence for iLUC that might be catalyzed by United States biofuel production through a “bottom-up”, data-driven, statistical approach. Results show that biofuel production in the United States from 2002 to 2007 is not significantly correlated with changes in croplands for corn (coarse grain) plus soybean in regions of the world which are corn (coarse grain) and soybean trading partners of the United States. "


Reference:

“Indirect Land Use Change for Biofuels: Testing Predictions and Improving Analytical Methodologies” Biomass and Bioenergy.  Seungdo Kim and Bruce Dale. Michigan State University.

Tragedy of the Anti-commons

In a past post I discussed the scenario described as the ‘tragedy of the commons’ which characterizes many environmental problems, especially problems of overuse and resource depletion. To review, the tragedy of the commons basically occurs when ‘individuals have unlimited access to resources in absence of well defined property rights ( Sobell and Leeson, 2006). Without property rights, there can be no transfer of rights and no market to establish a price by which environmental tradeoffs can be valued. The problem is the failure of government to define and enforce property rights.

The ‘tragedy of the anti-commons’ is another type of government failure. This occurs ‘when too many owners hold (such) rights of exclusion’ (Heller, 1998). In this case resources are subject to underuse. This can also be described as a ‘tragedy of political commons’ when too many individuals have veto power in decision making processes ( Leeson, 2006). And note, related to other posts regarding public choice theory, these individuals are acting in their own interest, face ineffective incentive structures, and likely have limited information. When they actually do make a decision, it is likely a poor one.

A prime example of the tragedy of the anticommons and resource under use is the government’s response to hurricane Katrina. Post 9-11, FEMA was placed under Homeland Security, adding an additional layer of bureaucracy to the decision making process. There were further problems at the local level. An example given in a 2006 article in the journal Public Choice describes an incident where one out of state sheriff complied with all of the necessary procedures and paper work that would enable him to direct his resources for a relief effort and was never able to help. A second sheriffs department ignored procedure and was able to bring 9 truckloads of supplies and 33 deputies to the scene.

We also see that in the private sector, where this problem is less of an issue, companies like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and State Farm insurance were well prepared and on the scene where they were needed.

Because of the tragedy of the anticommons, resources that could have been used in the relief effort were underutilized.

References:

Government’s Response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
Public Choice Volume 127,numbers1-2/ April 2006
Russel S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson

Heller, M. (1998). The tragedy of the anticommons.: Property in transition from Marx to Markets. Harvard Law Review, 111 930 622-688.

Knowledge Problem

Governments allocate resources in a fundamentally different way than individuals behaving cooperatively in voluntary exchange through the plan coordinating and knowledge generating mechanisms of markets. Individuals acting in their own interest results in a spontanous order guided by prices which reflect tradeoffs based on the knowledge and preferences of millions of individuals. Governments (via democratic processes) allocate resources based on the limited knowledge and preferences of a few voters, elected officials, or appointed bureaucrats. The fundamental problem facing all forms of government including democracies is that centralized decision makers never have enough information or proper incentives to act on the information at hand. As Economist F.A. Hayek (1945) said:

'the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all separate individuals possess'

This is referred to by economists as the 'knowledge problem.'

For more information related to issues regarding democratic decision making, see Public Choice Analysis.  

SOURCES:
The Use of Knowledge in Society
F.A. Hayek
The American Economic Review Vol 35 No 4 (Sept 1945) p. 519-530

The Coase Theorem

Traditionally when it comes to enviromental pollution, the general philosophy was that ‘the polluter pays’. A factory polluting the air or water should pay for the damages that are caused. In a much simpler case, if you build a house next to me and you don’t like the smell of livestock waste coming from my property, the traditional philosphy would hold that you could have the government stop my operation.

The insight that Coase brought was 1) yes it is true that my operation is harming you via air pollution. 2) however, in stopping me via government or legal intervention ( or taxing my waste production) you are harming me.

Coase says that the issue is that nonone owns the air that sourrounds my livestock operation and your home. There then follows a dispute over how the air should be used- to absorb livestock odor, or to provide a scent free atmosphere in your back yard. Whenever the cost of one’s behavior is not factored into a price at which a choice can be valued, I can harm you without compensating you for it. ( i.e. an externality exists)

However, if I own rights to the air, then I can choose to pollute the air. If you own rights to the air, then you can prevent me from polluting it. If noone owns the air, then it is first come first served or winner takes all.

That is not the end of the story though. What Coase emphasizes is that if I own the rights to pollute, you can pay me to limit my pollution i.e. buy those rights from me. I can then use the proceeds to alter my livestock nutrition, genetics, and management to reduce the odor my operation is causing. On the other hand, if you own the rights to pollute I can purchase those rights from you, or invest in technology that will allow me to continue my operation without violating your rights. I will do which ever is most optimal. This can be accomplished without major goevernemnt regulation, or the arbitrary imposition of a tax.

The assignment of property rights and the potential for bargaining results in behavior that is changed or altered to account for the negative impact our choices have on others. This is the essence of what is known as the ‘Coase Theorem”

The Median Voter Theorem

In the last entry on voting paradoxes, I mentioned that things are different if preferences are single peaked. Let’s look at another scenario.


voter X: A B C

voter Y : C A B

voter Z : C B A

In this case, no matter what order is undertaken, C always ends up being the law that is enacted. These preferences are single peaked. ( if you graph them, you will find that for each individual they will have a top choice ( a peak point), and as you move further away from that choice ( in the A-B-C spectrum) they prefer the other choices less and less. In the previous example, voter Y did not have single peaked preferences and that is what caused the cycling or order dependent outcomes.

With single peaked preferences there is a new problem. With single peaked preferences, the median point of the preference distribution will elicit the most votes. Only those laws or candidates with a centrist twist will get the majority of the votes. Only those voters with centrist views will be happy, and it makes it very difficult for candidates to be elected if they want to bring about major reforms. This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘median voter theorem.’

Voting Paradoxes

The next issue I would like to introduce is  under the umbrella of public choice is the arbitrariness of putting decisions to vote. Let’s look at a particular voting scenario to illustrate this.

VOTER X: A >B >C

VOTER Y: C> A> B

VOTER Z: B> C >A

If the voters were voting on this issue, voter X would prefer law A over law B and law B over law C. In shorthand – A > B > C. To summarize all of the choices of the voters we see that 2/3 of the voters have preference A > B, 2/3 of the voters have preference B > C, but when voting A vs. C, 2/3 have preference C > A.

See if you follow the application of this. If we have two elections and the first is made between policy B and C, then B will win (2/3 of the voters have preference B > C). If this is followed by a second election A vs. B (Because C was eliminated in the first election) then A will be the law that ultimately passes by majority rule.

Now if the order is changed, in which the first election is between A and B, A will win (because 2/3 of the voters rank A > B). Then in the second election when A goes against C, C will be the law that passes by majority rule (again because 2/3 of the voters have preference C > A).

So when voting on these policies, the process becomes arbitrary. The outcome depends on the order of the vote, so a cycling of choices ensues. According to public choice economist Gordon Tullock, any outcome can be obtained in majority voting by at least one voting method. There is nothing magical and there is no ‘truth’ in the outcome just because it was reached by majority rule. Majorities can be irrational and dangerous. The exception to this is if preferences are single peaked. I will present this in a separate entry, because it presents problems of its own.

The Tragedy of the Commons

http://www.prism-magazine.org/apr07/tt_01.cfm

“People like the freedom to choose their lifestyles, what they consume and when they consume it,” observes Attari. “However, the environment is a ‘commons’ that we share with other citizens of the world, and when individual choices start negatively impacting others, we need to understand how to change or alter those behaviors.”

The phrase ‘tragedy of the commons’ was first used by Garret Hardin in a 1968 issue of Science.

To illustrate, in the case of cattle grazing on public land, it is in the interest of the cattle owner to place as many cattle as possible on the land. Of course too many cattle will result in erosion and deterioration in forage quality, but this cost is shared among all grazers. The grazer does not bear the full cost of grazing an additional animal, but receives the full benefit. Each grazer acting in his own interest results in the degradation of the ‘commons’ for everyone.

Whenever the cost of one’s behavior is not factored into a price at which a choice can be valued, a commons problem exists. This is in essence what we get from Hardin ( ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’) after applying a little basic economics to his reasoning.

However, according to Coase (‘The Problem of Social Cost’) with the establishment of property rights and markets (bargaining) the externality of the commons can be internalized. Behavior is changed or altered to account for the negative impact our choices impose on others. Demsetz (Towards a Theory of Property Rights) goes on to say that property rights often evolve as a means to internalize externalities. Sometimes given the current state of technology, the costs of developing property rights and markets are greater than the benefits that would arise. However, with technological development, these cost structures change and new options become available. Today we can see how technology has allowed for many externalities (or commons problems) in agriculture to be internalized with examples such as biotechnology and GPS. The article linked above focuses on how engineering can contribute to this end.

Many of the ‘commons’ problems that Hardin cites in his article such as polluting the commons with insecticides and fertilizer have much been mitigated with modern technology and markets. See also - articles labeled 'coase theorem.'

REFERENCES:

Towards a Theory of Property Rights.
Harold Demsetz
The American Economic Review. Volume 57, Issue 2. May, 1967

The Problem of Social Cost
R. H. Coase
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 3, Oct., 1960 (Oct., 1960), pp. 1-44

The Tragedy of the Commons
Garret Hardin
Science, Vol 162 no 3859 Dec 13, 1968 p. 1243-1248

The Economics of Welfare
Arthur C. Pigou Macmillan and Co. London, Fourth edition, 1932. First published: 1920.
http://www.econlib.org/Library/NPDBooks/Pigou/pgEW.html

A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Bt Cotton and Maize on Nontarget Invertebrates
Michelle Marvier, Chanel McCreedy, James Regetz, Peter Kareiva
Science 8 June 2007:Vol. 316. no. 5830, pp. 1475 - 1477